Abstract. LEA is a symmetric block cipher proposed in 2014. It uses ARX design and its main advantage is the possibility of a fast software implementation on common computing platforms.
Introduction
Today's applications require efficient ciphers that can run on small devices with constrained computing power. Recent trends show an increasing number of services intended for Internet of Things [5, 8] requiring both high level of security and fast running speed on embedded devices. For such applications, lightweight cryptography is an ideal choice.
LEA [6] is a symmetric block cipher, using the ARX design (modular Addition, bitwise Rotation, and bitwise XOR). It offers fast software encryption, comparable to lightweight ciphers, and comes in the same key size variants as AES. There is an exhaustive security analysis report published by Bogdanov et al. [2] , stating that the cipher is secure against known cryptanalysis attacks. So far, there was only one attempt to break the cipher using fault analysis method, which requires 300 chosen fault injections for recovering the 128-bit secret key.
In this paper we present a Differential Fault Analysis attack on LEA. We exploit properties of a non-linearity of modular addition operation used in a round function. To recover the key, our attack requires two different positions of fault injections -in the last round and in the penultimate round. By using a random bit-flip model, we were able to recover a 128-bit secret key by using ≈258 faulty ciphertexts in average. If the precise fault position is known, our attack requires only ≈62 faulty ciphertexts in average. Thus, our method overcomes the fault attack on LEA published so far. This paper is organized as follows. First, we provide an overview of related work in Sect. 2. LEA cipher is described in details in Sect. 3. Section 4 provides methodology of our fault attack, following by Sect. 5 which summarizes our simulation results. Finally, Sect. 6 concludes this work and provides motivation for further work.
Related Work
Since the first publication proposing a fault analysis as a method to retrieve the secret information from the encryption process proposed by Boneh, DeMillo, and Lipton in 1997 [3] , this technique became very popular and testing of implementations against information leakage from fault attack has become a standard procedure.
Differential Fault Analysis technique was first introduced by Biham and Shamir [1] , using this powerful technique for revealing the DES secret key. Many other techniques using fault injection have been proposed so far, e.g. Collision Fault Analysis (CFA), Ineffective Fault Analysis (IFA), and Safe-Error Analysis (SEA) [4] .
There is only one fault attack on LEA published so far, using the Differential Fault Analysis technique. Myungseo and Jongsun [7] used 300 chosen fault injections in order to recover 128-bit secret key. They inject faults into three out of four words in the intermediate state at round 24.
From the attack methodology point of view, the closest attack proposal to this paper is the attack proposed by Tupsamudre et al. [9] , aiming at SPECK cipher. Since SPECK uses the ARX structure as well, authors aimed at the only non-linear operation, at the modular addition. They were able to recover the n-bit secret key by using n/3 bit faults on average.
LEA Cipher
In this section we will describe a symmetric block cipher LEA, introduced by Hong et al. [6] . According to security evaluation report [2] , LEA is secure against state-of-the-art cryptographic attacks.
The block size of this cipher is 128 bits, key sizes can be 128, 192, or 256 bits. Number of rounds for each key size is 24, 28, and 32, respectively. It is a pure ARX cipher, consisting of modular Addition, bitwise Rotation, and bitwise XOR operations on 32-bit words. We will further describe the design of the 128-bit key size version of the cipher.
Encryption Procedure
First, the 128-bit intermediate value X 0 is set to the plaintext P . Then, a key schedule process creates r round keys. The 128-bit output [3] ) of i-th round is computed as:
The resulting ciphertext is then obtained after r rounds in the following way:
The whole process is depicted in Fig. 1 . [5] ) for 0 ≤ i < 24 are then computed as follows: 
Key Schedule
Let K = (K[0], K[1], K[2], K[3]) be a 128-bit key. We set T [i] = K[i] for 0 ≤ i < 4. Round keys RK i = (RK i [0], . . . , RK iT [0] ← ROL 1 (T [0] ROL i (δ[i mod 4]), T [1] ← ROL 3 (T [1] ROL i+1 (δ[i mod 4]), T [2] ← ROL 6 (T [2] ROL i+2 (δ[i mod 4]), T [3] ← ROL 1 1(T [3] ROL i+3 (δ[i mod 4]), RK i ← (T [0], T [1], T [2], T [1], T [3], T [1]),
Attack Methodology
To perform a differential fault attack on LEA, we propose using two single bit flip faults, at X 22 [0] and at X 23 [2] . The propagation of the faults can be observed in Fig. 2 . We then retrieve the key by exploiting the modular addition operation.
To describe the proposed method, we first show how it works on a normal modular addition. First, let us assume that the operation is done on 32-bit values, A and B. The modular addition could then be expressed as: Table 1 , we can conclude that the value of B j = c j (highlighted with red color). However, if N 1 > 1, it can be concluded that the carry bit at j + 1 is flipped, and thus, B j = c j . Note that this attack requires that the carry bit c j is known and thus, it relies on the assumption that the 0-th bit could be faulted in the process (since c 0 = 0 is the only known carry from the beginning). Once the values of B j , c j and D j are known, the value A j could be determined (A j = D j ⊕ B j ⊕ c j ), as well as the value c j+1 (by observing the carry bit of A j + B j + c j ).
Next, we consider the case when there are multiple consecutive bit differences at (A ⊕ A * ), in bits j, ..., j + n. First, the attacker needs to determine if the carry bit at the bit j + i (i ∈ {0, ..., n}) is flipped or not. The attacker observes . Then, the attacker determines the value of the carry bit in the next bit (j + i + 1) using similar approach. The Table 1 summarizes the scenario when the carry values for the current bit and the consecutive bit are flipped or not. To highlight, if the value of the current bit is not flipped and if the value in the next carry bit is not flipped as well, then B j+i = c j+i (left part, highlighted with red color). If the value of the current bit is not flipped and if the value in the next carry bit is flipped, then B j+i = c j+i (left part). On the contrary, if the value of the current carry bit is flipped, and also the value in the next carry bit is flipped, then A j+i = c j+i (right part). If the value of the current bit is flipped and if the value in the next carry bit is not flipped then A j+i = c j+i (right part, highlighted with yellow color). Once the value of either A j+i , or B j+i is known, the other value and the next carry bit c j+i+1 could be determined. 
Experiments
We tested the proposed method by conducting an experiment using simulated faults. Here, the attacker uses one fixed plaintext, measured multiple times, and injects fault at different bit locations. Then, he collects all the faulty ciphertexts. As mentioned earlier, the attacker has to inject faults at two different positions of different rounds. The main target is LEA-128, due to its key structure. Each of the round keys can be segmented into 6 parts, each part consists of 32 bits. In LEA-128, the second, the fourth and the last part (RK i [1] , RK i [3] , and RK i [5] ) are identical, based on the key scheduling. In previous section, it is shown that the attack exploits the modular addition D = (A B).
Phase 1
First, the attacker injects single bit flip fault at X 22 [0], and the fault will propagate to X 24 [0], X 24 [2] and X 24 [3] . The fault propagation will not be affected by the XOR operation with the round keys. [5] ) has been determined in previous phase, together with X 23 [2] from the previous step and X 24 [2] , which is the output, the attacker can determine RK 23 [4] .
Thus, the remaining of last round key, RK 23 [2] and RK 23 [4] , can be retrieved in this phase. 
Observations
One observation regarding the attack is that the last bit (MSB) could not be obtained because the next carry bit cannot be determined. This condition holds for each part of the key and hence, in total, 4 bits of the key could not be determined. Thus, these remaining key bits have to be brute-forced. Another problem could also occur due to the rotation of the bits. Due to rotation ROL 9 , the resulting bit difference might not be consecutive, for example, ROL 9 (0 . . . 01 . . . 1) = (110 . . . 01 . . . 1) . To mitigate this problem, it could be considered as separate multiple consecutive faults. From the example, the fault can be considered as (110 . . . 0) and (0 . . . 01 . . . 1). Since the attack only considers bits of D and D * which coincide with the faulty bits in A * , the previous method still works.
In Fig. 3 , we show the number of faults required to retrieve the value of the input of the modular addition. In the case where each bit could be flipped precisely, around 30 faults are required. However, if the bit could be flipped only randomly, more faults are required.
Based on the experiment, if the attacker cannot determine the location of a single bit flip fault, and hence, could only inject faults randomly at single bit, it requires ≈130 and ≈128 for the first and the second fault respectively in order to determine the last round key, minus the 4 bits mentioned earlier.
However, if the attacker could determine the precise location of a single bit flip, it requires only ≈31 and ≈31 faults for the first and the second fault respectively. This is because each fault reveals one bit of the key and in each attack, 2 parts of the last round key could be determined. For the previous attack model, more faults are required in order to obtain the value of each bit, similar to the coupon collector problem (Θ(nlogn)). These results were verified by simulating 500 independent experiments on different scenarios.
Conclusions
In this paper we have proposed a differential fault attack on LEA. We used a random bit flip model, aiming at the last two rounds of the cipher. Using this model, we were able to retrieve the secret key with around 258 faulty encryptions in average. However, if the attacker can determine the position of faults, number of faults can be reduced to only 62 faulty encryptions in average. This result overcomes the only known fault attack on LEA published so far which needs 300 chosen faulty encryptions in order to reveal the key.
In the future, we would like to acquire practical results for our fault model, using the software implementation of LEA on a microcontroller, with the laser fault injection technique.
